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FEBRUARY 1971	 NUMBER 3
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969-
TAX DEFERRAL AND TAX SHELTERS
STANLEY S. SURREY*
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 had a rapid journey through the
Congress. The rapidity of the trip is measured in terms of the rela-
tively short time spent on the Act by the Committees compared with
the range of items dealt with and the degree of complexity they in-
volved. On the completion of the Act, the task began of absorbing
the great variety of changes into the day-to-day application of the
income tax. All the groups engaged in that application commenced to
swarm over the measure, each with its appointed task. First the quick
articles in the professional tax journals giving the initial road direc-
tions to harried practitioners. Then the tax institutes with more de-
tailed descriptions and responses to the perplexities, questions and
sudden new insights raised by these practitioners. Next the law reviews
attempting to provide perspective and analytical comment. Within the
Treasury the huge task of regulations and rulings commenced. Out-
side the Treasury the tax advisers began to shape their clients' planning
to the new rules, probing for the safe areas, charting the new pitfalls
and risks, exploring the new tax escapes that were provided, searching
for the unforseen tax escapes, remodeling the tax shelters that serve
the well-to-do.
Several of the articles in this issue of the Boston College Industrial
and Commercial Law Review relate to the 1969 Act provisions per-
tinent to some of these shelters and thus provide one overall theme.
Much of the legislative struggle in 1969 was over these shelters, and
properly so, for they demonstrate glaring inequities in our income
tax. It is in the syndication of these tax shelters—real estate, oil,
cattle, farming activities, leasing of equipment—that we can see por-
trayed many of the essential defects of the tax law. Each carefully
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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developed investment prospectus, with its description of how the tax
law turns ventures that investors would never think of on a before-tax
basis into highly profitable after-tax arrangements, is a graphic il-
lustration of the failures of tax reform. Unfortunately, despite the
1969 Act, and sometimes because of it—for example, the newly intro-
duced five-year amortization for railroad equipment and rehabilitated
housing—the prospectuses still stream out and investment advisers
still maintain their tax shelter departments. Indeed, one would sug-
gest that well-rounded Treasury and congressional tax staffs should
each contain a resident physician, whose main qualifications are that
he be in the 50 percent to 70 percent brackets and promises to turn
over all the investment proposals he receives. For each proposal would
contain, when properly read, a signpost for tax reform.
There are many explanations why these shelters persist--among
them being lobbying pressures and political forces in the cases of farm-
ing and oil; the pull of housing needs in the case of real estate and
the failure to develop an adequate set of non-tax subsidies, especially
for low-income housing; 1 and technical inadequacy in the shaping of
provisions affecting leasing.2 Each shelter has a history and story of its
own. But there is a common theme and perhaps its tracing and under-
standing may be helpful in thinking about the congressional attitude
toward these shelters.
The shelters essentially turn on the acceleration of the tax deduc-
tion for investment expenditures, through writing-off the cost of the
investment either fully at the outset or in the first few years, or writing-
off most of it in the early years of the investment. The key to the tax
shelter is this ability to recover the investment quickly and thus achieve
"tax losses" consisting of the excess of deductions representing the
cost of investment over income from the investment. These "tax losses"
—which are not real losses but only the return of investment—elimi-
nate from tax not only the income from the project but, more impor-
tantly, other income as well, as the "tax losses" spill over to be used
as offsets against that other income—a doctor's fees, an investment
banker's commissions, an actor's earnings, an investor's dividends, a
top executive's salary. This is what the syndicators are selling and
their investors are buying—be it in the form of accelerated deprecia-
tion in real estate and the expensing of interest and taxes during con-
1 See Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to
Replace Tax Expenditures With Direct Government Assistance, 84 Ham. L. Rev. 352
(1970).
2
 Thus, the IRS has not succeeded in framing a standard to separate lease from sale
that adequately measures the required residual of the lessor, so as to denigrate the
influence of tax maneuvering. With still greater acceleration of depreciation being
promised (see p. 310 infra) the leasing shelter will regain a significance that had previously
been lessened through repeal of the investment credit.
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struction, coupled with the leverage of debt financing that magnifies
the depreciation basis; five-year amortization and like leverage in
rehabilitated housing; current deduction of intangible drilling expenses
in oil; current expensing of development cost in cattle or apple or-
chards; accelerated depreciation or amortization, also mixed with debt
leverage, in leasing. The tax laws make these deductions marketable
commodities in the hands of an oil drilling syndicate, a real estate
developer, a cattle operator, or leasing syndicate.' The opportunities
for maneuver are many and tempting. For example, syndicators of
oil and cattle shelters are learning about the debt leverage that il-
luminates the real estate shelter. They are also realizing that leverage
in oil and cattle investments, where the deductions for investment
are immediate, will provide even greater tax advantages than where
the investment write-off is through the accelerated depreciation of the
real estate shelter.
The investor in buying these deductions is buying "deferral" of
his tax liabilities on the income offset by the deduction. He escapes
current taxes on current income and need only pay the deferred taxes
when the investment is either closed out or in its later stages—unless
before then his advisors may have worked out an arrangement that
even escapes that consequence. In a number of instances, this post-
ponement of tax and the nature of the shelter operate to switch the
deferred tax liability from ordinary income to capital gain, which
often improves the shelter considerably. The Congress, when it does
think about these shelters unfortunately has usually focused only on
the capital gain aspect and moved only to correct it, while letting the
deferral stand. One has the feeling that "deferral" is not considered
by legislators as much of an advantage—after all, the taxpayer is
"only postponing" a tax payment that he will have to pay at some
point.
Indeed, bow could a legislator have cause to think otherwise
when he hears a Treasury Department pushing hard to legislate a
tax escape for exporters—DISC--tell him that only "deferral" is in-
volved in the measure.' Or when a President and a Secretary of the
8
 This facet of the tax shelter raises the interesting question of what Section 183 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, added in 1969, is referring to when it speaks of "an
activity not engaged in for profit." Clearly the investors in tax shelters are not investing
in the before-tax profit yielded in these transactions, but only in the after-tax result. As
the text indicates, they are investing in a tax deduction. Does the real thrust of section
183 lie in requiring an expectation of a realistic before-tax profit, one commensurate
with the investor's normal investment outlook? Should the existence of a small before-
tax profit, a paltry plus, in some of these shelters be enough to provide safe conduct
to an investor who in his other, not tax-sheltered, investments seeks a far greater
before-tax return?
4
 See generally Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals, House Ways and Means
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Treasury in announcing increased acceleration of depreciation through
the use of shortened tax lives unrelated to a taxpayer's replacement
experience (Asset Depreciation Range System), state that the "liber-
alization of depreciation allowances is essentially a change in the
timing of a tax liability. The policy permits business firms to reduce
tax payments now ... and to make up these payments in later years"
(italics in original). 5
The syndicators of tax shelters know differently. They are using
their computers and investment know-how to explain to their investors
just how valuable this "only deferral" and "only timing" can be. They
do so by relating the benefits of the deferral to investment yield after
tax and thereby directly quantify the value of the deferral. But who
tells this to the legislator? He understands "exemption" from tax
liability and will usually feel he should do something about that. But
he views "deferral" as almost the opposite of exemption and hence
not a cause for moral indignation. Indeed, how would one graphically
and simply make it clear to a busy Congressman just how valuable
is this "deferral" which he often so casually approves because at best
he sees it as only a minor benefit? How would one make it clear that
very often "deferral" may mean as much as "exemption" to the in-
vestor in a tax shelter?
I suspect the task of communication is not an easy one. Suppose
A, in the 60 percent tax bracket, invests $100 in an asset. Assume
business accounting and ordinarily applied tax rules would require
the cost of the asset to be capitalized, but that a special tax provision
permits the cost to be expensed in the year of acquisition, thus defer-
ring tax liability on the income offset by the deduction. Assume that
a sale of the asset in ten years would produce ordinary income. How
do you express or describe A's tax benefit?
Do you use the analogy of the interest-free, non-recourse loan
without collateral? Do you ask the Congressman if he would blithely
let his debtors say they will pay their debts to him at some indeter-
minate future date and forget about interest or security in the mean-
time?
The immediate deduction of $100 saves A $60 in tax. On sale
of the asset A will repay that $60 in tax, since his tax liability
then will be $60 more than it would have been if the $100 cost
bad been capitalized. One way to describe the result is to say
Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 499 et seq. (May 12, 1970); Hearings on Amendments
925 and 1009 to H.R. 17550, Senate Finance Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 et seq.
(Oct. 9, 1970).
5 Statements by the President and Treasury Secretary David M. Kennedy on Asset
Depreciation Range, January 11, 1971, 71-7 CCH Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 11 6366.
310
INTRODUCTION
that the government has made a loan of $60 to A without asking
for interest, collateral or a definite time for payment of the loan.
The higher A's tax bracket, the larger the interest-free loan.
What is this loan worth to A? Assume that borrowing $60
from a bank would cost him 10 percent interest. A thus saves
paying 10 percent a year on $60—or $6—less the benefit of the
income tax deduction of $6 interest a year, or a net of $2.40 per
year, for a total of $24. That saving can be expressed in terms
of the present value of money; it would be presently worth $19.46
to A (using a discount rate of 4 percent if A can freely borrow
at that after-tax rate) to accelerate the deduction from year ten
to year one. If A can earn 15 percent on his investment, then
we could ask what A would pay to get this interest-free loan, and
the answer would be "up to $26.49" using an after-tax discount
rate of 6 percent in relation to net annual interest of $3.60.
Does it help to say that the after-tax rate of profit on what is
left at risk under the tax accounting of immediate deduction and defer-
ral of tax is equal to the before-tax rate of profit on the investment
as counted under financial accounting?
Assume the asset in which A invested $100 will be sold for
$250 in ten years, leaving A a profit of 150 percent before tax.
If A had capitalized the cost of the asset, he would owe in tax
60 percent of $150 ($250 sales proceeds less $100 cost) or $90.
A thus would have an after-tax gain of $60 on a $100 investment
(sales proceeds of $250 less $90 tax less $100 investment), giving
an after-tax profit of 60 percent. But if A expenses the cost, his
tax on sale is 60 percent of $250 ($250 sales proceeds less zero
cost), or $150, leaving A with $100. A, however, in this situation
has actually only invested $40, since $60 of the cost of the ini-
tial investment was repaid to him by the government at the start.
A has thus gained $60 ($250 sales proceeds less $150 tax less
$40 initial investment) on a $40 investment, or a profit of 150
percent after-tax. In effect, his after-tax rate of profit on the $40
investment is equal to the before-tax rate of profit on the over-
all investment. (If taxpayer B in the same bracket had invested
$40 with the cost capitalized, earned 150 percent before-tax and
sold the asset, B would pay a tax of $36 and net $24, for an
after-tax profit of 60 percent.)
In a progressive tax system, after-tax rates of profit should
decline as the taxpayer's rate bracket increases. With expensing
of cost substituted for capitalization, the rates of profit are not
affected.°
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Does it help to say that the investor is really treated, on what
he has at risk after the expensing, in exactly the same way as a tax-
exempt organization investing that same amount?
In the above example A has ended up in the same situation as
would a tax-exempt organization which had invested $40 and
obtained a profit of $60, or 150 percent of its investment.
Do you explain that the immediate expensing of an investment
is the equivalent of allowing the investor a tax-free return of the in-
come yield from what he has left at risk in the venture—his initial
investment less the tax benefit of its write-off?
In the example above, it can be seen that A has made a tax-free
investment of his $40, since his after-tax rate of profit on $40 is
equal to his before-tax rate of profit on the overall investment.'
This is the form of explanation used by Professor Shoup in his
book on Public Finance: 8
Thus, if a corporation is contemplating construction of a
plant costing $1,000,000 it need supply only $600,000, if the
tax rate is 40 per cent. The remaining $400,000 will come
from its savings of tax on profits from the remainder of its
business. By deducting $1,000,000 instead of nothing, in the
year of construction, it saves $400,000 in tax for that year.
The cash flow from the $1,000,000 plant in future years will
6 If the profit on the transaction is treated as capital gain (but not subject to the
25% alternative rate), then the tax on the sale where the item is capitalized is only
$45 instead of $90. A, therefore, would have an after-tax gain of $105 on an investment
of $100 if the item had been capitalized, or an after-tax profit of 105%. Where the item
is expensed, he has an after-tax gain of $135 on an investment of $40, or an after-tax
profit of 337.5%. The combined advantage of accelerated deduction and the capital gain
benefit give him an after-tax rate of profit greater than his before-tax rate of profit.
This is the "negative income tax" aspect considered in Professor Davenport's article. See
also W. Andrews, Federal Income Taxation, Appendix A (1969).
I The matter can be expressed in still another way. A can be considered as investing
$40 and receiving back his original investment plus $60. The government has "invested"
$60 and also received back that investment plus $90. A's gain on the investment he made
is 150%, free of tax. Looking back at the interest-free loan analogy, it will be seen that
if A had borrowed $60 from a bank and then capitalized the $100 cost, A would have
ended up with a $30 profit on his original $40 investment, or an after-tax profit of 90%
(proceeds of $250 less tax of $90 less $60 loan repayment less $24 net interest cost less
$40 investment) compared with that of 60% if he had used $100 of his own capital. The
leverage of the loan has increased A's after-tax profit from 60% to 75%. When A
"borrows" interest-free from the government, he ends up with $60 profit ($24 more
than in the bank loan case because of the absence of interest cost), or an after-tax profit
of 150%. A is obtaining the advantage of leverage without paying the cost of leverage,
i.e., interest. The leverage of the loan plus the absence of interest enable A to achieve
after tax the same rate of return on his investment as he would expect to make before
tax, i.e., his investment is tax-free.
8 C. Shoup, Public Finance 302 (1969).
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be taxed at 40 per cent, since no further depreciation will be
allowed. The corporation retains 60 per cent of this cash
flow. It contributed only 60 per cent of the capital that made
the cash flow possible. The corporation therefore obtains the
same percentage rate of return on what it put in, of its own
money, as if (1) there had been no income tax and (2) it had
financed the entire $1,000,000 itself and had kept all the cash
flow.20
20 The fact that completely accelerated depreciation, when coupled with
complete loss offset, is equivalent to exemption of net return from the asset,
under an income tax, was discovered by E. Cary Brown (see his "Business-
Income Taxation and Investment Incentives," in Income, Employment, and
Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen [New York: Norton,
1948], pp. 30940), reprinted in Musgrave and Shoup, Readings in the
Economics of Taxation. See also Musgrave, Theory of Public Finance,
pp. 343-44.
The use by Professor Shoup of the term "discovered" in this
context (see his footnote 20 above) is interesting. Perhaps a
Congressman can be pardoned for not appreciating the benefit
of deferral when it apparently eluded public finance specialists
for 35 years of our income tax history.
Does it help to say that "permitting the capital cost of an asset
to be expensed has the effect of exempting the income from ownership
of the asset from taxation"?
This is the way the Treasury Department, when it is being
analytically objective, explains the tax benefits from an im-
mediate write-off of an investment cost. The quotation is from the
1970 Treasury Department Study on Tax Depreciation Policy.'
Footnote 4 of that Study amplifies the point:
An intuitive explanation of this somewhat surprising re-
sult takes the following form: A $1,000 asset will generate
some stream of revenue over its life; if the cost is expensed
and the tax rate is 48 percent, the net cost of the asset to the
owner (ignoring the slight discount of the deduction as
above) is only $520, after tax. However, in the future, each
$1 of revenue will be taxed fully, with no allowance for de-
preciation, leaving $0.52 of net return on the $520 invest-
ment, the same ratio as $1 to $1,000 as if there were no tax.
Incidentally, in those cases, as in minerals taxation, where
the total present value of expensing and depletion deductions
may actually exceed the cost of the investment, the effective
9
 116 Cong. Rec. E6963-6975 (daily ed. July 23, 1970).
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tax rate is negative. That is, in some instances the tax rate
equivalent of an investment tax incentive is a tax rate less
than zero.
In the example used earlier of A investing $100 and having $60
of cost repaid to him, it is said that A received a tax-free return
on the $40 he had at risk equal to the before-tax rate of return.
But the story can be continued. A may reinvest the $60 return
of cost obtained through the initial deduction. If this investment
is also expensed, it will generate an additional return of $36. On
this second investment A thus has $24 at risk. Once again it can
be shown that, on the $24 at risk, the after-tax rate of return is
150 percent. A third round is possible. A invests the $36 and
receives back $21.60. The money at risk is $14.40. If A continues
to reinvest the returns of the cost of the investments, the total
investment will be $250 but the money at risk only $100. On this
$100 at risk, A will earn 150 percent after taxes. A can thus be
regarded as receiving back tax-free a profit of 150 percent on his
$100 at risk. This is the return that an investor would receive
on $100 at risk in a world without taxes, assuming he also earned
150 percent on his investment.
In this sense, assuming A can reinvest his cost repayments
with similar expensing of the cost, A is indifferent to whether
he is offered (1) full exemption from income tax on his initial
investment or (2) a deferral of tax on a total sum invested (an
immediate expensing of that sum) that would leave him with an
amount of his money at risk equal to that initial investment.
This is the way the Treasury Study appears to view the situation."
Some of the tax shelters, such as oil and cattle, essentially pro-
vide for immediate expensing of all or a major part of the invest-
ment, so that the Treasury Department's description, and that
of Professor Shoup which is along the same line, are fully appli-
cable. Other tax shelters, such as real estate and leasing, while
not giving immediate expensing, provide for an acceleration of
the deduction of the investment cost and hence a very rapid
write-off of the investment in its early years. The essentials of
the analysis are the same, however, with the rate of tax on the
money at risk being somewhere between the zero point of im-
10
 This is the way the matter is described in P. Musgrave, The Theory of Public
Finance (1954) 343-344, and presumably is the way Professor Shoup views the matter in
his footnote 20 quoted supra at 313, where he uses the term "asset", as does the Treasury
Department. The term presumably does not refer to the overall amount of the invest-
ment. While A may be indifferent to the choice of exemption or deferral posited in the
text, there is a difference to the economy since the deferral route, to provide indifference
to A, does involve a larger amount of investment.
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mediate expensing and the full tax rate, depending on the degree
of acceleration of deduction. Thus, the Treasury Study indicates
a variety of ways to show the benefits of accelerated depreciation
—equivalence in asset price reduction, lowered effective tax rate,
increased rate of return. There is, however, no reference to these
benefit descriptions, and their upside-down effect depending on
the taxpayer's tax bracket, in the President's and Treasury De-
partment's 1971 announcement of depreciation revision, referred
to above, providing an arbitrary 20 percent reduction in Guide-
line depreciable lives and abandonment of any linkage with useful
life."
Assuming that a taxpayer really was replacing his assets at the
former Guideline life (itself presumably a generous assumption
for many business taxpayers in view of the campaign they were
mounting to repeal the reserve ratio test—a successful campaign
with the President's depreciation announcement), the 20 percent
shortening of that life amounts for a 48 percent corporate tax-
payer (12 year life) to a rate reduction of 4.4 percentage points
on income from the assets, bringing the rate to 43.6 percent."
For a taxpayer who was falling behind the Guideline life in his
actual replacement policies, the freedom to use a life 20 percent
shorter than the Guideline will involve a still greater reduction
11 This depreciation revision was presaged in the Report of the President's Task
Force on Business Taxation 3 et seq. (Sept. 1970), recommending a 40% reduction in
Guideline lives as well as elimination of the reserve ratio test. The latter step of course
ends any effort to link tax accounting and taxable income with business income and
financial accounting in the use of depreciation to measure income. In this light the
following quotations from the Task Force Report, found in setting of a recommendation
to depart from the tax rule of including prepaid income received by an accrual basis
taxpayer, have an ironic twist:
The Task Force has given consideration to the increasing differences which
exist between the determination of net income of business taxpayers according
to generally accepted accounting principles and the determination of taxable
income for 'federal income tax purposes . . • .
This divergence results in unnecessary complexity and controversy. The
objective of generally accepted accounting principles and tax accrual concepts
is basically the same—the determination of the net income of the business on
an annual basis. Both business taxpayers and government auditors are generally
familiar with accounting principles, and compliance would be facilitated by
conforming the determination of taxable income more closely with such
principles. Business taxpayers would have greater confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the tax if such differences were minimized.
Id. at 60. The Task Force Report also totally overlooks the link between tax shelters and
accelerated depreciation and seems oblivious to the damage done in 1954 to the tax system
when accelerated depreciation was introduced without any protection against its potential
for manipulation and the "sale" of its benefits.
The Treasury Department, in its announcement of changes in the depreciation rules,
unfortunately followed the lead of the Task Force, though using a 20% reduction.
12 Treasury Department Study on Tax Depreciation Policy, supra note 9, giving
data for 40% shortening of lives.
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in tax rate. Is the public informed of this when the President
and Treasury Secretary speak only of a "change in the timing
of a tax liability"?
In terms of the tax itself deferred, does it help to say that the
deferral permits a taxpayer to receive, without any investment of his
money and without an interest cost, the after-tax amount that others
in the same bracket would have received on an investment equal to
the tax deferred (assuming the same before-tax rate of return)?
Suppose A, in the 60 percent bracket, receives $100 of income
which would normally be taxable, but a special tax provision
relating to the income permits A to defer the tax on the income
until a later date. Assume that date is ten years in the future,
when the transaction is closed. Assume A would have invested
the $40 of after-tax income he would have obtained, if the $100
of income had been taxable, in an asset that earned 150 percent
in ten years. A would thus have $60 more, and owe a tax of 60
percent, or net $24 ($100 of proceeds less tax of $36 less invest-
ment of $40, or $24). This, on an investment of $40, is an after-
tax return of 60 percent. But if the $100 was not presently taxable
when received and tax was deferred, A can invest $100. He will
here end up after ten years with $60 of profit on his investment
of $40 ($250 of proceeds less tax of $150 less investment of $40,
or $60), or an after-tax return of 150 percent. He thus obtains
on the income on which tax was deferred an after-tax rate of
return equal to his before-tax rate of return. This is, thus, the
same situation as resulted in the case of the expensing of a cost
that should have been capitalized, except that in that situation
the expensing reduced the tax on "other income." Deferral thus
permits a taxpayer to invest tax-free the amount that would have
remained for him if the tax had been collected at the start rather
than deferred.
In terms of the tax itself deferred, as stated above, the deferral
permits a taxpayer to receive, without any investment of his
money and without an interest cost, the after-tax amount that
others in the same tax bracket would have received (assuming
the same before-tax rate of return) on an investment equal to
the tax deferred. A has received a $60 profit, which is $36 more
than he would have received if he had invested $40. This $36
is equal to the net after-tax profit of a taxpayer in the 60 percent
bracket who invests $60 and obtains a profit of 150 percent before
tax. The higher the taxpayer's bracket, the larger is the amount
he can so receive.
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I ask these questions with the feeling that these ways of putting
the matter do not clearly get the point across to a busy legislator of
the value of deferral. But how to do it?
There is another aspect that must also be made clear, and that
is how the value of deferral increases as the investor's tax bracket
rises. This part of the task may be easier. Thus, one method of com-
munication may be to compare the benefit of deferral with an equiva-
lent subsidy made directly by the government in the form of a grant
or a loan. As the McDaniel-Kaplinsky article indicates, it can then
be shown that, the better off the investor is and the higher is his tax
bracket, then the more he would receive as a grant, or the larger the
loan and the larger the interest saved and so on. In this way the lop-
sided or indeed upside-down character of deferral benefits presumably
can be seen.
In our example involving A above, the higher A's bracket, the
greater is the "loan" or leverage obtained and hence the less of
A's money he has to risk to earn the 150 percent rate of profit.
Thus, in any situation in which X dollars are needed to earn a
certain rate of profit, if the cost of the investment is expensed,
then the result is that (1) the higher the taxpayer's bracket the
less is his share of the investment and the greater the leverage
accorded him by the government, that is, the less is the amount
of his money at risk; and (2) since the leverage is awarded free
of interest, the interest saved in obtaining the leverage will in-
crease his after-tax gain so that the after-tax rate of piofit on
his investment is equal to his before-tax rate.
Articles in this issue explore the variety of remedies Congress
has used to counter these tax shelters built on deferral. The articles
illustrate either the inadequacy of the remedies or their undeveloped
form. Thus, in farming we have described in Professor Davenport's
article the sorry state produced by the current Treasury's splitting
and distracting the forces of reform' and thus fatally weakening them
by its sponsorship of the EDA recapture approach, although the re-
formers in Congress had opted for the more effective initial disal-
lowance of excess deductions. Professor Halperin's article, in contrast,
shows how the sanction of initial disallowance of excess deductions
unsuccessfully advanced by the reformers in the farm area survived
in strengthened form as a technique in the limitation of the deduction
for interest on investment indebtedness. 13
 The analysis in this article
describes the possibilities for growth which this concept possesses,
as opposed to the false trail and dead end of the EDA technique.
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, * 163(d).
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We might here refer to the minimum tax for tax preferences,"
which may also contain the seed of a counter-attack on the deferral
benefit. This tax, coming along after reform efforts have still permitted
the deferral, in effect then places an interest charge on that deferral.
The Senate Committee Report thus states: "[The] fact of deferring
tax for an extended period of time is itself a tax preference for which
the 5-percent [10-percent in final Act] tax is a moderate charge.""
The charge is indeed moderate, for the effective rate of "interest"
which it produces is equal only to 10 percent divided by the period
of deferral." But the idea is there, and perhaps the provision may
develop effectiveness in the future.
The above-mentioned set of articles dealing with some of the tax
shelters thus shows the tangle of incomplete remedies and false starts
emerging from the 1969 Act. The articles on foundations and charitable
remainder trusts in contrast describe the stronger provisions that
emerged in the charitable area when Congress, prior proposals and
the current Treasury were pretty much all working in concert. The
article on foundations prophesies that the small family foundation will
not survive the 1969 Act. The provisions of that Act make the founda-
tion far less useful as a tool for family planning, say to maintain
control of a business or as a device to gimmick "charitable" gifts. At
the same time, the new operational requirements and the sanction of
penalties on foundations managers combine to require an attentive
management markedly in contrast with the careless handling that
often characterized a family's operation of its foundation. But we can
hardly see this as a loss to society when we realize that most of these
foundations were the result of planning to solve a family's tax and
business problems, and philanthropy was but an incidental and hence
neglected attribute. Indeed, the real "causa mortis" of the small foun-
dation lay in its having been discovered by the tax and estate planners.
The 1969 Act is only the belated effort of Congress to take the foun-
dation device back from them and restore it to philanthropy.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 56-58.
---- 15 Report of Senate Finance Committee on Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. Rep. No.
91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 111- (1969).
16 See McDaniel and Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System To
Combat Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study In Tax Expenditures, infra.
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